SERAP calls for dismissal of DSS’s ₦5bn defamation lawsuit

The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has asked the Federal Capital Territory High Court sitting in Maitama, Abuja, to dismiss the ₦5 billion defamation suit instituted against it by officials of the Department of State Services (DSS).

While adopting its final written address before Justice Yusuf Halilu, SERAP argued that the claimants failed to prove that the alleged defamatory publication was directed at them personally.

The suit, marked FCT/HC/CV/4547/24, was filed by Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele against SERAP and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare. The claimants are seeking ₦5 billion in damages, ₦50 million as legal costs, a public apology to be published on SERAP’s website and in national newspapers as well as broadcast on television, and 10 per cent annual interest on the judgment sum until full payment.

They alleged that SERAP falsely reported that DSS operatives invaded its Abuja office in September 2024, a claim they said harmed their personal reputations and that of the agency.

At the resumed hearing, counsel to SERAP, Victoria Bassey, while adopting the organisation’s final written address and reply on points of law, urged the court to dismiss the suit.

She argued that under established legal principles, a plaintiff in a defamation case must show that the publication clearly referred to them. Citing Supreme Court authorities, she said where a plaintiff is not expressly named, it must be shown that reasonable readers would understand the publication to refer specifically to the claimant.

Bassey maintained that the publication in question referred only to the DSS as an institution and did not mention the claimants’ names, ranks, units, or any personal identifiers.

She submitted that the DSS is a national security agency with thousands of personnel and that statements directed at such a broad institution could not automatically amount to personal defamation against individual officers. She therefore urged the court to strike out the suit.
Counsel to the second defendant, Oluwatosin Adesioye, also adopted his final written address and described the action as unfounded, urging the court to dismiss it in its entirety.

He argued that although a person need not always be named in a defamatory publication, a claimant whose identity is not expressly stated must establish special circumstances linking the publication to them. According to him, the claimants failed to do so.

He further noted that the alleged identification of the claimants through vague physical descriptions was insufficient, adding that during trial, a witness admitted that he only associated the publication with the claimants after being informed by the DSS, rather than from the publication itself.

Adesioye stressed that defamation must be assessed based on the understanding of an ordinary reader at the time of reading the publication, not after receiving additional information. He maintained that the claimants failed to plead or prove that they were so widely known within the DSS that readers would immediately associate the publication with them.

Counsel for the claimants, Akinlolu Kehinde (SAN), in adopting their final written address dated January 30, 2026, urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought.

He challenged the competence of the second defendant’s written address, arguing that it exceeded the page limit prescribed by the court rules and should therefore be discountenanced.

On the substantive issue, Kehinde contended that the publication did in fact refer to the claimants, arguing that under the principle of innuendo, a defamatory statement may be established if persons with relevant background knowledge could identify the claimants as the subjects of the publication.

In response, counsel to the second defendant argued that the court rules did not prescribe any specific penalty for exceeding page limits and that the court retained the discretion to overlook such irregularities in the interest of substantial justice. He also pointed out that the claimants’ own final address exceeded the permitted page limit.

In his remarks, Justice Halilu observed that written addresses could not substitute for evidence already placed before the court.

He noted that addresses are meant to assist the court in understanding the law in relation to the evidence, stressing that the court would ultimately be guided by the evidence on record. The judge thereafter reserved judgment in the matter.